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Abstract
We consider the role of unobservables, such as differences in search frictions,
reservation wages, and productivities for the explanation of wage differentials be-
tween migrants and natives. We disentangle these by estimating an empirical general
equilibrium search model with on-the-job search due to Bontemps et al. (1999) on
segments of the labour market defined by occupation, age, and nationality using a
large scale German administrative dataset.
The native-migrant wage differential is then decomposed into several parts, and
we focus especially on the component that we label “migrant effect”, being the
difference in wage offers between natives and migrants in the same occupation-age
segment in firms of the same productivity. Counterfactual decompositions of wage
differentials allow us to identify and quantify their drivers, thus explaining within a
common framework what is often labelled the unexplained wage gap.
Keywords: immigrants, decomposition of wage differentials, job search, turnover
JEL Classification: J31, J61, J63
1. Introduction
The empirical literature on the labour market experience of immigrants often
focuses on differences in observable characteristics between migrants and natives to
explain wage differentials. Less explored is the role of unobservables, such as differ-
ences in search frictions, reservation wages, and productivities. Yet, it is precisely
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these factors that modern search theory emphasises to be important for wage dis-
persion. We examine and disentangle the role of these various unobservables in
explaining migrant-native wage differentials by adapting to the migrant context the
empirical general equilibrium search model with on-the-job search due to Bontemps
et al. (1999).
The estimation of this structural model on segments of the labour market defined
by occupation, age, and nationality enables us to decompose the native-migrant wage
differential into several parts. In particular, we focus on the component that we la-
bel “migrant effect”, being the difference in wage offers between similar native and
immigrant workers in firms of the same productivity. This effect is of interest as we
thus control for firm-level differences as measured by their productivities, which have
recently been shown using firm-level data to contribute systematically to the wage
gap (Aydemir and Skuterud (2008) in the case of Canada, de Matos (2012) for Portu-
gal, and Bartolucci (2013b) for the German case).1 One particular advantage of our
approach is that we do not require firm-level data (data confidentiality promises usu-
ally deny public access), as the productivity distribution emerges as an equilibrium
relationship. We estimate the migrant effect on internationally accessible German
administrative data, the scientific use file known as IABS which is a 2% subsample
of the German employment register. This enables us to contribute to the recent lit-
erature on the immigrant-native wage gap as follows. While the role of observables is
well understood for explaining the wage gap, the role of unobservables is less so. Such
wage gaps arise when, for instance, migrants have systematically lower reservation
wages (whose role is examined in detail in Albrecht and Axell (1984)), or when firms
in a migrant-native segmented labour market (which we discuss below) are less pro-
ductive in the migrant segment, or when wage-posting firms in one segment derive
greater monopsony power from e.g. greater search frictions. Our analysis focuses
on the roles of differences in the job turnover parameters, behavioural differences
induced by differences in reservation wages, and productivity differences.2 Within
1The migrant effect corresponds to within-firm wage differentials of workers with similar observ-
able characteristics reported in these papers.
2 The migrant effect is not synonymous with (taste-based) discrimination as we do not model
this explicitly (for two approaches see Bowlus and Eckstein (2002), and Flabbi (2010)). Instead,
similar to Bowlus (1997) and Bartolucci (2013a) in the context of the gender wage gap, we have
an indirect link: if market discrimination exists and influences behavioural patterns, it will be
captured in those parameters, while other avenues of wage-impacting discrimination will be picked
up by the productivity distributions. In contrast to costly taste-based discrimination, the new
monopsony theory suggests the possibility of profitable monopsonistic discrimination stemming e.g.
from differential search friction (Manning (2003)). For instance Barth and Dale-Olsen (2009) and
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a common framework, we establish the relative importance of each of these factors.
Having estimated the model’s parameters and thus the actual wage gap and migrant
effect, we quantify the roles of the various unobservables in several counterfactual
experiments.
The structural model is estimated on a large German administrative panel. Ger-
many is a particularly interesting and relevant case since it hosts the largest numbers
of foreign nationals in Europe, and immigration is known to be predominantly low-
skilled. According to Eurostat, 7.13 million foreign nationals resided in Germany in
2010, about 8.7% of the total population. The size of the IABS allows us to strat-
ify the analysis by nationality, occupation and age. The resulting subsamples are
sufficiently large to permit precise estimation of the model’s structural parameters.
Moreover, since this is administrative data, the usual concerns about the quality of
survey data in a migrant context (sample size, measurement accuracy, and use of
retrospective information) are absent.
We briefly describe some aspects of our applications of the structural model. In or-
der to control for heterogeneity in observables, we follow common estimation practice
in the search-theory literature by partitioning the labour market into many segments.
These segments are defined in terms of occupation, age, and nationality.3 Given the
skill profile of migrants, we consider only the low and medium skill occupations. Each
segment is thus assumed to be potentially a separate labour market, characterised by
its own job turnover parameters (the job arrival and separation rates). Turning to
the unobservables (for the econometrician), firms in each segment differ in terms of
productivity, and workers differ in terms of reservation wages. Such reservation wage
heterogeneity is plausible given the absence of a legal minimum wage in Germany,
and the fact that the location decisions of labour migrants in Roy-style models are
usually based on comparisons of expected incomes in source and host country. Mi-
grants might trade-off wage and non-wage job characteristics differently to natives,
given their well-known clustering. Besides this preference component, reservation
wages also feature an institutional one, but this is less important as contributory
unemployment insurance benefits are independent of immigrant status.
The assumption of separate markets for natives and immigrants and the associ-
Hirsch et al. (2010) consider the gender wage gap in the light of this. We relate the migrant effect
to the Hirsch and Jahn (2012) analysis of monopsonistic discrimination in Section 2.4.
3The term “nationality” rather than “immigrant status” is used here for greater precision given
the coding practices of the German Statistical Office. Most German data sources record nationality
and not country of birth since German nationality was conferred by descent until the year 2000,
when Germany changed its legislation to ius soli (this change does not affect our sample).
3
ated notion of job segmentation conforms to existing international empirical evidence.
For instance, using Portuguese data, de Matos (2012) shows that immigrants “work
in different industries and occupations than natives” (p.10), and the sorting of im-
migrants is also observed by Aydemir and Skuterud (2008) for Canada. As regards
Germany, D’Amuri et al. (2010) observe that recent immigrants are significantly
more likely to compete with established immigrants rather than with natives. Vel-
ling (1995) is an early paper to report “evidence of strong occupational segregation”
(p.1) between natives and immigrants. This finding has recently been reaffirmed
by Lehmer and Ludsteck (2011), Bru¨cker and Jahn (2011), Bartolucci (2013b), and
Glitz (2012) who concludes that “ethnic segregation [..] is endemic in the German
labour market” (p.15).4 This segmentation is also consistent with the evidence of
strong occupational immobility we find in our data (which has also been observed
for other countries, e.g. by de Matos (2012) for Portugal).5
For each occupation-age segment, we estimate using maximum likelihood the job
turnover parameters, the parameters characterising the reservation wage distribution,
and the firms’ productivity distribution. We find substantial differences in Germany
between natives and foreigners. The segment-specific raw average log wage gaps in
our data range from .09 to .45, the overall log wage gap being .22, which is in line
with reports in the literature for Germany (e.g. Dustmann et al. (2010) report an
unconditional average log wage gap of .23, Hirsch and Jahn (2012) report a gap
of .2, while Lehmer and Ludsteck (2011) report predicted wage gaps ranging from
.08 to .44 depending on nationality). Turning to the qualitative implications of our
model estimates, we find that migrants experience job separations more often than
natives but also find jobs more quickly. However, the net effect is such that migrants
typically experience greater search frictions. The job turnover parameters decline
in age. Across all segments and nationality, transitions into new jobs happen more
4At the same time, these papers provide complementary perspectives on the native-immigrant
wage gap in Germany: descriptive Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions (Velling (1995), Lehmer and
Ludsteck (2011)), wage setting (Bru¨cker and Jahn (2011)), monopsonistic discrimination (Hirsch
and Jahn (2012)), while Bartolucci (2013b) provides an interpretation in terms of taste-based
discrimination. D’Amuri et al. (2010) pursue a different concern and estimate the wage and em-
ployment effects of recent immigration in Western Germany (and find little evidence for adverse
effects on native wages and employment levels).
5The segmentation assumption has also been imposed routinely in recent search-based structural
analyses of the gender wage gap. For instance, Flabbi (2010) considers only whites possessing a
college degree, Bowlus (1997) considers two education groups, and Bartolucci (2013a) considers four
sectors and two skill groups. Our partition is finer as we also consider three age groups in addition
to our three occupation groups (and our estimates remain unbiased should the true partition be
such that some segments be aggregated).
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quickly than transitions into unemployment. This finding of migrants’ higher job
separation and offer rates is consistent with differences in employment protection; in
particular, Sa (2011) reports that migrants in Germany are much more likely than
natives to work on temporary contracts. As regards the reservation wage distribution,
there are some workers in all segments with high reservation wages who turn down
new job offers when wage offers are too low. However, migrant workers are less
demanding on average than natives.
Migrants receive wage offers that are lower than those for natives controlling for
the same productivity. This migrant effect is the largest for clerks and service work-
ers, and small for unskilled workers. In particular, the average migrant effect for the
skilled ranges between 12% and 15% of the average wage gap, and for clerks and
service workers the range is 23% to 39%. For all occupation groups, the migrant
effect declines across age groups. These estimates imply that the largest part of
the within-group native-migrant wage gap is explained by differences in the produc-
tivity distribution (one explanation for such productivity differences is advanced in
de Matos (2012)). At the same time, the migrant effect is significant in many seg-
ments, and, if expressed in terms of the average segment-specific wage of natives, it is
found to be consistent with estimates of “unexplained wage differences” reported in
the literature for Germany based on standard Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions (for
instance, Lehmer and Ludsteck (2011) report a range from 4 to 17%) or comple-
mentary approaches (Hirsch and Jahn (2012) report 6% while Bartolucci (2013b)
suggests discrimination effects ranging between 7 and 17%). Our counterfactual de-
composition approach allows us to quantify the (marginal and joint) roles of the
underlying drivers of the migrant effect in terms of labour market turnover param-
eters and behavioural differences captured by the reservation wage distribution. We
find that reducing the job separation rate for migrants to that of natives typically
leads to a large reduction in the migrant effect. This is of interest to policy makers
since this parameter is targetable by e.g. deploying measures to improve migrants’
employment protection.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we set out the model as well as
the estimation approach. A validation exercise, reported in the Appendix, verifies
that the estimation of the structural parameters works well. Section 2.4 introduces
the migrant effect, the decomposition of the actual wage differential, and the coun-
terfactual scenarios in the context of the simulated data (which are later re-examined
in Section 5 with the real data). Section 3 describes the data used for the analysis.
The estimation results are presented in Section 4, and the resulting decompositions
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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2. The Analytical Framework
The search model with wage-posting and on-the-job search has been described
and discussed extensively before in the literature. Therefore, only its most salient
features will be outlined. We use the extension of the Burdett and Mortensen (1998)
model, and the subsequent empirical generalisation and implementation of van den
Berg and Ridder (1998), due to Bontemps et al. (1999). This extends the basic set-
ting by introducing productivity heterogeneity among firms, which improves the fit
of the model to wage data, and heterogeneity among workers in terms of the unob-
served opportunity cost of employment, which improves the fit to the unemployment
duration data. As discussed above, the latter is very plausible in the migration
context against the background of Germany’s institutional rules.
The labour market is partitioned into many segments, defined in our empirical
implementation by age, occupation and nationality. Each segment is considered as
a labour market for which the following model and estimation approach applies.
The structural parameters are of course allowed to vary across segments, but for
notational simplicity we suppress a segment index. This segmentation assumption
precludes individuals moving from one segment to another, which is consistent with
the evidence of occupational immobility in Germany presented below and the exter-
nal evidence discussed in the Introduction. If the labour market is integrated over
some stipulated segments, then the estimates of the structural parameters should be
the same statistically; the segments can then be added to improve estimation effi-
ciency. In line with the segmentation hypothesis we find that the estimated structural
parameters differ across occupation-age-nationality groups. We proceed to outline
the model for one labour market segment.
2.1. The Model of a Labour Market Segment
The labour market segment is populated by a fixed continuum of workers with
measure M , and a fixed continuum of firms with measure normalised to one. Firms
differ in terms of (the marginal) productivity (of labour) p with distribution Γ. Un-
employed workers differ in terms of their reservation wages b with distribution H.
At any point in time, a worker is either unemployed or employed, and searches
for jobs both off and on the job. Individuals draw offers by sampling firms using a
uniform sampling scheme. Jobs are terminated at the exogenous rate δ, and job offers
arrive at the common rate λ irrespective of the worker’s state. This is a restrictive
assumption but necessary for identification.6 Let k = λ/δ.
6 This assumption yields, for the unemployed, a simple solution for the opportunity cost of
6
Job offers are, of course, unobservable to the econometrician. The job offer distri-
bution is denoted by F , whereas the observable wage or earnings distribution (i.e. of
accepted wages) is denoted by G. Let [w,w] denote the support of F , and, for nota-
tional convenience, F = [1− F ]. F is related to G through an equilibrium condition
implied by the theoretical structure. Firms post wages and there is no bargaining.7
Workers are risk neutral and maximise their expected steady state discounted fu-
ture income. Their optimal strategy has the reservation wage property: an employed
individual moves to a new employer if the offered wage exceeds the current wage (so
the model does not allow for wage cuts); an unemployed individual accepts a new
job if the offer exceeds b, and otherwise rejects the offer and remains unemployed.
On-the-job search thus generates further ex-post heterogeneity in reservation wages.
In steady-state equilibrium, the flows of workers into and out of the unemploy-
ment pool are equal, which determines the unemployment rate u. Consider the stock
of employed workers who earn a wage less than or equal to w. Two sources constitute
the outflow from this stock, namely: (i) exogenous job separations at rate δ and sub-
sequent transits into unemployment, and (ii) wage upgrading as employed workers
move to poaching firms. The combined outflow is thus (1 − u)G(w)(δ + λF (w)).
The flow into this stock consists of unemployed individuals who receive wage of-
fers above their reservation wage. Conditional on b, the probability of this event is
uλ[F (w) − F (b)]. The marginal inflow is obtained by integrating up to w over the
distribution of b in the stock of the unemployed. Denoting the latter by Hu, the
steady state equation for the labour market yields the relationship between Hu and
H, namely uHu(b) =
∫ b
−∞
[1 + kF (x)]−1dH(x).
Equating inflows and outflows relates the wage offer distribution F to the realised
wage distribution G. To be precise, Bontemps et al. (1999, Proposition 2) show that
the unemployment rate u and the actual wage distribution G satisfy
u =
[
1
1 + k
H (w) +
∫ w
w
1
1 + kF (x)
dH (x)
]
+ [1−H (w)] (1)
employment: it is simply equal to b. If job offer arrival rates were to differ, Mortensen and Neumann
(1988) show that this opportunity cost would be an intractable function of all the primitives of the
model, leading to feedback to workers’ optimal strategies from wages and firm behaviour.
7For an analysis of wage determination in the presence of heterogeneity, search on-the-job, and
strategic wage bargaining, see Cahuc et al. (2006). They find no significant bargaining power for
intermediate and low skilled workers in France.
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G (w) =
H (w)−
[
1 + kF (w)
] [
1
1+k
H (w) +
∫ w
w
1
1+kF (x)
dH (x)
]
[
1 + kF (w)
]
(1− u)
. (2)
Risk neutral firms have constant-returns-to-scale technologies, and post wages
that maximise steady state profit flows, the profit per worker being p−w. Firms do
not observe the reservation wage of a potential employee. In equilibrium, firms offer
wages to workers that are smaller than their productivity level, so firms have some
monopsony power. Bontemps et al. (1999, Proposition 9) show that in equilibrium
there exists an increasing function K which maps the productivity distribution Γ
into the wage offer distribution F , so that the wage offer satisfies w = K(p) with
K (p) = p−
[
p− w
(1 + k)2
H (w) +
∫ p
p
H (K (x))
1 + k [1− Γ (x)]2
dx
]
[1 + k [1− Γ (p)]]2
H (K (p))
(3)
and F (w) = Γ (K−1 (w)). Hence given the frictional parameter k, the reservation
wage distribution H and the productivity distribution Γ, equation (3) yields the wage
offer distribution F , which then via (1) yields the equilibrium unemployment rate
and through (2) the actual wage distribution G.
Our dataset does not include measures of firm productivity but, of course, exten-
sive wage data. Using expressions of the key quantities in terms of the actual wage
density g, the productivity distribution Γ becomes estimable. In particular, it can
be shown that
(1− u) =
k
(1 + k)
∫ w
w
g(t)
H(t)
dt
, (4)
1[
1 + kF (w)
] = (1− u) ∫ w
w
g (t)
H (t)
dt+
1
[1 + k]
. (5)
Equation (4) follows from (5) with w = w. The equilibrium productivity levels are
p = K−1 (w) = w +
H (w)
2 (1− u) g (w)
[
1 + kF (w)
]
+ h (w)
. (6)
2.2. Identification
We seek to estimate this model using data by labour market segment on em-
ployment and unemployment durations, as well as data on wages and accepted wage
8
offers. These data are sufficient to identify8 the structural parameters, once the
reservation wage distribution is parametrised. We assume that H is a normal dis-
tribution with unknown location and scale parameters, (µ, σ) ≡ θ. Since arrivals of
job offers and separations are assumed to follow Poisson processes, sojourn times are
exponentially distributed.
In particular, the wage data identify the wage distribution G, and the minimum
and the maximum of the observed wages identify the infimum w and the supremum
w of the wage offer distribution. The steady state flow equations in form of (4)
and (5) then identify the wage offer distribution F given λ/δ and H(.; θ), which
yield the productivity distribution Γ via (3). The job separation rate is identified
from job durations ending in a transition to unemployment, as these are exponential
variates with parameter δ, the mean duration being δ−1. Job durations ending in
a transition to another job with wage w are exponential with parameter λF¯ (w).
Together with unemployment durations ending in a transition to a job with wage
w these identify the remaining parameters λ and θ. Since the reservation wage is
unobservable, the marginal unemployment durations are mixtures of exponentials,
Pr{Tu ≤ t|b ≤ w} = 1−
∫ w
−∞
exp(−λF¯ (b)t)dHu(b; θ|b ≤ w).
Absent such mixing, when H is degenerate and all agents accept all wage offers
above the common reservation wage, transitions to a new job from each labour
market state would permit separate identification of the job offer arrival rates, and
thus would give rise to testable overidentification restrictions. In the presence of
unobservable heterogeneity captured by H, overidentification restrictions only arise
with additional data that would permit, for instance, an independent estimation of
the wage offer distribution (see e.g. Christensen et al. (2005) for such an approach).
2.3. Maximum Likelihood Contributions for Labour Market Segments
The preceding constructive identification argument suggests that we can estimate
the structural parameters using maximum likelihood on our data on unemployment
and employment durations and wages. The likelihood contributions we consider in
detail next differ slightly from those in Bontemps et al. (1999) since our data are
flow and not stock samples. The validation exercise reported in Appendix B verifies
the good performance of our estimation procedure on artificial data. The density
of accepted wages, and thus G, is estimated using kernel methods, and enters all
likelihoods as a nuisance parameter.
8Eckstein and van den Berg (2007) discuss identification issues in empirical search models more
generally.
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Consider first the likelihood contributions of unemployed agents. Since the unem-
ployment rate is a function of the model parameters, it needs to enter the sampling
plan. In equilibrium, the probability of encountering an unemployed individual is
given by (4). Since the reservation wage b is unobservable, it needs to be integrated
out. We distinguish between individuals for whom b ≤ w as they accept all job offers,
a mass of H(w), and those for whom b > w as they reject offers below b. Recall that
F (w) = 0, and we assume that all individuals included in our sample would accept
at least one wage offer w ∈ [w,w]. This implies that the sup of H is lower than the
sup of F , b ≤ w, so this specification does not take into account cases of permanently
unemployed individuals. Conditional on b, the distribution of unemployment dura-
tions in our flow sample is exponential with parameter λF (b). The accepted wage,
w, is a realisation of the wage offer distribution truncated at b: f (w) /F (b). The
likelihood contribution of an unemployed Lu is thus, having substituted out u,
Lu (λ, δ, θ) = λ
(1−dr) exp (−λt)
H (w)
1 + k
[f (w)](1−dr)+
+
∫ w
w
{[
λF (b)
](1−dr)
exp[−λF (b) t]
[
f (w)
F (b)
](1−dr) 1[
1 + kF (b)
]
}
dH(b), (7)
where dr is a dummy variable equal to one if the spell is right-censored (the only
relevant censoring in our data). In this case it is only known that the unemployment
duration exceeds t.
We turn to the likelihood contributions of employed workers, denoted by Le. The
probability of sampling an employed individual receiving a wage w is (1− u) g (w).
We have further data on the job duration and the exit state. Let v be a dummy vari-
able equal to one if the destination of an employment spell is unemployment, and zero
if the destination is another job. We have two competing risks: Exits to unemploy-
ment occur with probability δ/
[
δ + λF (w)
]
and exits to higher paying jobs occur
with probability λF (w) /
[
δ + λF (w)
]
. Conditional on being employed with wage
w, the job duration has an exponential distribution with parameter
[
δ + λF (w)
]
. If
a transit to unemployment is observed at duration t, this implies that the duration
of the other latent risk factor exceeds t, the joint density factorises, and we have
δ exp(−δt) exp(−λF (w)). Therefore
Le (λ, δ, θ) = (1− u) g (w) exp
{
−
[
δ + λF (w)
]
t
}
×
{
δv
[
λF (w)
](1−v)}(1−dr)
, (8)
where (1 − u) is given by equation (4). If an employment spell is right-censored,
10
indicated by dr, we only know that the job duration exceeds t.
2.4. Migrants, Natives, Wage Differentials and the Migrant Effect: Concepts and
Simulated Data
We develop an illustrative example in order to introduce our key concepts. Con-
sider two labour market segments, one occupied by natives (N) and the other by
immigrants (F). Workers in either segment exhibit the same observable characteris-
tics (in our empirical application below we consider the same skill and age group).
We calibrate the two segments (in line with the empirical results) as follows: the
job turnover parameters of migrants are assumed to be higher than those of natives,
δF = .016 > .005 = δN and λF = .13 > .07 = λN , while natives have higher mean
reservation wages, µF = 45 < 60 = µN . The productivity distribution in the seg-
ment for natives is assumed to first order stochastically dominates that of migrants:
ΓF (p) = 1− (pF/p)
α and ΓN(p) = 1− (pN/p)
α with α = 2.1, p
F
= 40, and p
N
= 50.
The validation exercise reported in Appendix B discusses the estimation results.
Figure 1: Wage offer curves for natives and migrants, and the “migrant effect”.
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For this economy, the aggregate wage gap is substantial (equal to 32.02), but
differences in the productivity distributions are likely to play an important role (recall
the discussion in the Introduction). Figure 1 Panel A depicts the resulting wage offers
given by (3) as functions of productivity. These enable us to consider a component
of the wage gap which we label “migrant effect”, depicted in Panel B, being the
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difference in wage offers between similar native and immigrant workers in firms of
the same productivity: wN(p)−wF (p). This effect is of interest since we thus control
for firm-level differences as measured by their productivities.
This concept of the migrant effect suggests to decompose the aggregate wage
differential9 between migrants and natives,
∫
A
wN(p)dΓN(p) −
∫
A
wF (p)dΓF (p), into
the aggregate migrant effect and a weighted difference between firm productivities
(where A denotes the intersection of the supports of the productivity distributions).
Solving for the aggregate migrant effect, we thus have∫
A
[wN(p)− wF (p)] dΓN(p) =
∫
A
wN(p)dΓN(p)−
∫
A
wF (p)dΓF (p) (9)
−
∫
A
wF (p)d [ΓN(p)− ΓF (p)] .
We briefly comment on the relationship between the migrant effect and the con-
cept of monopsonistic discrimination, as examined in e.g. Hirsch and Jahn (2012).
The latter is measured by these authors indirectly from a search-model inspired de-
composition of the long run wage elasticity of labour supply using reduced-form job
separation models that are estimated separately on data for migrants and natives. In
our model, greater monopsony power of firms (measured by the absolute or relative
distance between productivity, i.e. the 45 degree line, and wages as illustrated in
Figure 1.A) in the migrant segment gives rise to the migrant effect. Our approach
enables us to go beyond measuring the migrant effect, as we explain it within a com-
mon framework in terms of the relative importance of differences in the job turnover
parameters and behavioural differences induced by differences in reservation wages.
In particular, a closer inspection of (3) shows that the wage offers are complicated
functions of these structural parameters, wi(p|pi, αi, µi, σi, λi, δi) for i ∈ {N,F}.
2.4.1. Counterfactual Wage Decompositions
In order to identify the principal drivers of the migrant effect, and to conduct
policy experiments, we consider next a second decomposition of the wage gap based
on counterfactuals. In particular, we ask: what would be the migrant effect and the
wage differential if one group is imputed counterfactually parameter values of the
other group? For instance, choosing natives as the reference group and equalising
counterfactually the reservation wage distribution parameters (µ, σ), the counterfac-
9For a decomposition of wage differentials in a reduced form setting, see Dustmann and Theodor-
opoulos (2010). Note that their decomposition considers, as we do, the wage offer function, but
their empirical approach does not recover it from the data.
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Table 1: Counterfactual decompositions of the wage differential using natives
as the reference group.
Counterfactually Remaining Wage Migrant
equalised para. differing para. differential effect
(1) p, α, µ, σ, λ, δ 32.022 6.825
(2) µ, σ p, α, λ, δ 30.096 3.747
(3) δ p, α, µ, σ, λ 28.973 1.954
(4) λ p, α, µ, σ, δ 34.029 10.032
(5) µ, σ, δ p, α, λ 27.423 -0.524
(6) α, µ, λ p, α, δ 31.694 6.300
(7) λ, δ p, α, µ, σ 30.459 4.328
(8) µ, σ, λ, δ p, α 28.758 1.610
(9) p, α µ, σ, λ, δ 4.904
(10) p, α, µ, σ λ, δ 1.932
(11) p, α, δ µ, σ, λ 0.750
(12) p, α, λ µ, σ, δ 7.814
(13) p, α, µ, σ, δ λ -1.842
(14) p, α, µ, σ, λ δ 4.400
(15) p, α, λ, δ µ, σ 2.741
Notes: Based on the DGP given in Appendix Table B.16, and the decompo-
sition of equation (10). Rows 9+: the wage differential equals the migrant
effect because the productivity distributions are the same.
tual migrant effect is, using (9),∫
A
[wN(p|pN , αN , µN , σN , λN , δN)− wF (p|pF , αF , µN , σN , λF , δF )]dΓN(p) (10)
=
∫
A
wN(p|pN , αN , µN , σN , λN , δN)dΓN(p)−
∫
A
wF (p|pF , αF , µN , σN , λF , δF )dΓF (p)
−
∫
A
wF (p|pF , αF , µN , σN , λF , δF )d[ΓN(p)− ΓF (p)]
with Γi(p) = Γi(p|pi, αi) for i ∈ {N,F}.
Table 1 collects the exhaustive list of possible counterfactual experiments, and
the resulting quantifications of both the counterfactual migrant effect and wage dif-
ferential (the first term on the right hand-side of (10)). The reference group consists
of natives. In column 1 we list the parameters we counterfactually equalise, so (µ, σ)
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in row and experiment 2 is a shorthand for µF = µN and σF = σN . The residual pa-
rameters enumerated in column 2 constitute thus the sources of the remaining wage
differences. In the first experiment, reported in row 1, no parameters are equalised,
hence the reported results are based on actual wages (i.e. we use the actual wage
decomposition (9)). In experiment 9 and later, we equalise the two parameters of the
productivity distribution, p and α (Bartolucci (2013a) labels such differences in the
productivity distribution parameters “segregation”). This nils the last term in equa-
tion (10), so migrant effect and wage differential are equalised. In all experiments
we use simulated data based on the DGP of Appendix Table B.16 but the results
reported next are in line with our data-based empirical results for the comparative
statics and policy experiments reported in Section 5.2.
The actual migrant effect of 6.8, reported in experiment 1, is substantial, about
21% of the wage differential. At the same time this implies that the largest con-
tribution to the native-migrant wage gap is made by the differences between the
productivity distributions. Turning to the drivers of the migrant effect, experiments
13-15 consider the marginal roles of δ, λ, and (µ, σ). Recalling that λF > λN ex-
plains the negative sign in experiment 13. Also note that δF > δN , and µF < µN
while σF = σN . Experiment 14 suggests that the difference in the separation rates
plays a large quantitative role in the determination of the migrant effect, the latter
being 4.4; the complementary insight is that, by experiment 3, equalising the job
separation rates reduces the migrant effect to 29% of its former size. The differences
in mean reservation wages, considered in experiment 15, leads to a smaller migrant
effect of 2.7. The joint effect of δ and (µ, σ), reported in experiment 12, equals 7.8,
and is slightly larger than the sum of the two marginal effects. We defer discussing
the policy implications of these results to Section 5.2 as these are similar to those
based on our empirical results.
3. The Data
The empirical analysis is based on the 2% subsample of the German employment
register provided by the Institute of Employment Research, known as IABS (75-04
distribution). For a detailed description of the dataset, see Bender et al. (2000). This
large administrative dataset for Germany, covering the period 1975-2004 consists
of mandatory notifications made by employers to social security agencies. These
notifications are made on behalf of workers, employees, and trainees who pay social
security contributions. This means that self-employed individuals, civil servants,
and workers in marginal employment are not included. Notifications are made at the
beginning and at the end of an employment or unemployment spell. Information on
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individuals not experiencing transitions during a calendar year is updated by means
of an annual report. Hence, we are able to use a flow sample in our empirical analysis.
Apart from wages, transfer payments, and spell markers, the dataset contains
some standard demographic measures, including nationality, as well as occupation
and firm markers. The education variable is not used since its problems, particularly
in the migrant context, are well-known and skills are better measured by the occu-
pation (see Fitzenberger et al. (2006) for a detailed discussion; we do not use the
suggested imputations since the education variable for migrants, when observed, is
likely to be of poor quality, as discussed in Bru¨cker and Jahn (2011, p. 296 point (ix))
and Lehmer and Ludsteck (2011, p. 900)). Wage records in the IABS are top coded
at the social security contribution ceiling. However, this ceiling is not binding for our
population of interest, namely individuals (natives and foreigners) in low and middle
skill occupations. We use real wages in 1995 prices. The occupational information is
provided in extensive (three digit codes) but non-standard form. We therefore map
this coding into 10 major groups based on the International Standard Classification
of Occupations (ISCO-88). The Data Appendix provides some details. Since immi-
gration is known to be predominantly low skilled, we select from these 10 groups
3 low and middle skilled occupations, namely (1) unskilled blue-collar workers, (2)
clerks and low-service workers, and (3) skilled blue-collar workers.
The data allows us to distinguish between three labour market states: employed,
recipient of transfer payments (i.e. unemployment benefits, unemployment assis-
tance and income maintenance during participation in training programs) and out
of sample. Unfortunately, none of the two last categories corresponds exactly to the
economic concept of unemployment. This issue is discussed in several studies, see
e.g. Fitzenberger and Wilke (2010). For example, participants in a training program
are transfer payment recipients despite being in employment (they are considered
unemployed from an administrative point of view), while individuals that are regis-
tered unemployed but are no longer entitled to receive benefits appear to be out of
the labour force. Therefore, the dataset provides a representative sample of those
employed and covered by the social security system, but somewhat mis-represents
those in the state of unemployment. For our purposes, all individuals who are out of
sample between two different spells are classified as unemployed, so only two labour
market states are considered: unemployment and employment. The definition of
unemployment used in our analysis is therefore somewhat broad: we assume that
unemployment is proxied by non-employment, strictly speaking non-employment is
an upper-bound for unemployment.
Nationality is included as a binary variable indicating whether an individual is
German or a foreign national. German nationality is usually conferred by descent,
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and not by place of birth. The data set does not report place of birth. Given this
coding practice, some young foreign nationals might be born and raised in Germany.
At the same time, ethnic Germans who immigrated from the former Soviet Union
after the fall of the Berlin Wall will be classified as German, although they usually
speak little German and have low skills. However, Dustmann et al. (2010) have
argued that the former issue is ignorable, and we address the second by repeating
the estimation using the subsample of individuals that were present in the data before
the fall of the Berlin Wall, see the analysis in Section 4.5.3.
3.1. The Sample
The data used in our empirical analysis is restricted to male full-time workers aged
25 to 55 years old residing in West-Germany (East Germany is excluded because
of the peculiar transition processes taking place in the wake of unification). This
sample is grouped into cells by occupation, nationality, and age. We define three age
groups (25-30, 30-40, and 40-55) to proxy for potential experience. The aim of the
grouping is to arrive at cells in which individuals are fairly homogeneous, and which
are sufficiently large for the subsequent econometric investigation.
Table 2: Occupational Immobility: Share of Stayers by Segment
Age group Natives Foreigners
Unskilled 89.52% 88.27%
Twenties 85.72% 85.45%
Thirties 88.03% 88.56%
Fourtyplus 92.54% 92.38%
Clerks 90.06% 88.52%
Twenties 88.03% 87.33%
Thirties 87.44% 89.00%
Fourtyplus 91.82% 91.89%
Skilled 92.48% 92.56%
Twenties 90.35% 91.03%
Thirties 90.22% 92.43%
Fourtyplus 94.26% 95.25%
The model is estimated using a flow sample of employed and unemployed in-
dividuals, who experienced a transition from their original state within the period
1995-2000. We consider the first such transition, and any subsequent transitions are
ignored. For all these individuals we can determine the beginning of their original
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state, so that all durations are complete. The only exception is constituted by a
small number of individuals who disappear from the dataset in the period 1995-
2000, in which case their durations are considered censored. We note that the period
1995-2000 was a period of fairly stable growth (around 2%, with SD=.007) and un-
employment (around 8%, with SD=.007). Focussing on this stable period reduces
the scope for biases arising from asymmetric responses of natives and foreigners to
the business cycle.
Foreigners in our sample are predominantly low skilled: 94% of the population
of foreigners are included in our three occupational groups, while the corresponding
number for natives is approximately 86%. The remainder occupational category
is the highly skilled, which we have excluded because of their small share in the
population of migrants (moreover, their earnings are excessively top-coded). Table 2
considers the occupational immobility by labour market segment. It is evident that
occupational mobility is small, as most workers remain in the same class. This gives
further support to our segmentation hypothesis, and such occupational immobility
has also been found for other countries (e.g. by de Matos (2012) for Portugal).
Table 3 summarises the labour market transitions for all nationality-age-occupation
cells observed in our flow data. For both natives and foreigners, we observe many
more transitions from employment than from unemployment. However, for natives,
the majority of transitions from employment are to another job, whereas for the ma-
jority of foreigners the destination is unemployment. Hence, in terms of the structural
parameters, we expect higher separation rates for foreigners, δF > δN . The dura-
tion data for the unemployed, examined briefly in the next subsection, suggests that
foreigners exit more quickly, so that we expect λF > λN at least for this group.
Turning to the wage data, Table 4 reports for each labour market segment the
mean and standard deviation of wages (measured by daily gross wages in 1995 DM),
as well as the average log wage gap, ∆ log(w) ≡ log(wN)− log(wF ). Natives receive
substantially higher mean wages than foreigners across all occupation groups. The
segment-specific raw average log wage gaps in our data range from .09 to .45. The
overall log wage gap of .22 is in line with reports in the literature for Germany
(e.g. Dustmann et al. (2010) report an unconditional average log wage gap of .23,
Hirsch and Jahn (2012) report a gap of .2, while Lehmer and Ludsteck (2011) report
predicted wage gaps ranging from .08 to .44). The three occupational groups can be
partially ordered in terms of mean wages: mean wages for the skilled exceed those
for the unskilled for all age groups and across nationalities. Foreign clerks and low-
service workers assume an intermediate position, but mean wages of natives in this
group can exceed those for skilled workers.
Rather than only restricting attention to the mean wage, Figure 2 depicts the
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Table 3: Descriptives for the transition data.
Natives Foreigners
Age Transitions Services Unskilled Skilled Services Unskilled Skilled
25-30
All 8060 5097 11939 1887 2347 3023
from E 6088 3085 8450 1438 1670 2155
E→ U 2132 1764 4418 718 997 1225
E→ E 3432 1037 3562 373 351 550
from U 1972 2012 3489 449 677 868
U→ E 1879 1932 3275 431 637 795
Ecensored 524 284 470 347 322 380
Ucensored 93 80 214 18 40 73
30-40
All 12800 7748 15381 2074 2752 3681
from E 10723 5506 12448 1637 2067 2830
E→ U 2988 2644 5284 735 1128 1451
E→ E 6717 2400 6157 453 477 795
from U 2077 2242 2933 437 685 851
U→ E 1853 2055 2601 393 619 749
Ecensored 1018 462 1007 449 462 584
Ucensored 224 187 332 44 66 102
40-55
All 16900 12770 24530 1494 2938 5004
from E 13912 9399 19127 1146 2090 3726
E→ U 4538 4467 8973 505 1101 2019
E→ E 6671 3206 6848 329 513 1024
from U 2988 3371 5403 348 848 1278
U→ E 1554 2013 2130 244 540 582
Ecensored 2703 1726 3306 312 476 683
Ucensored 1434 1358 3273 104 308 696
Notes: “Censoring” refers to a drop out from the administrative register.
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Table 4: The average wage gap in the transition data by labour market segment.
Services Unskilled Skilled
Age Wages Native Migrant Native Migrant Native Migrant
25-30 mean 122.36 88.94 107.77 92.54 124.74 111.07
sd 41.86 44.15 37.68 36.09 29.94 35.21
∆ log(w) .32 .15 .11
30-40 mean 156.35 99.38 120.94 97.99 135.79 116.65
sd 51.22 55.02 38.24 36.61 32.04 36.22
∆ log(w) .45 .21 .15
40-55 mean 158.17 112.74 125.05 107.49 138.29 126.20
sd 48.09 56.81 36.71 36.89 33.29 33.50
∆ log(w) .33 .15 .09
Notes: ∆ log(w) ≡ log(wN )− log(wF ). The overall log wage gap is .22. Wage dating: for transitions
from employment (E→ {U,E}), these are the last earned wages in this state, for transition out of
unemployment (U→ E) these are the first wages earned in the new job.
kernel estimates of the realised wage densities (the solid lines refer to natives). The
most pronounced distributional difference exist for the semi-skilled workers (clerks
and service workers), and the differences persist across age groups. By contrast, for all
other occupations, the differences decrease in age. The density estimates also exhibit
“blips” in the far left tails of the wage densities. This bimodality leads to problems
in the estimation of the model, manifesting themselves by the occurrence of spikes
in the estimated productivity density. We overcome this issue by truncating the
wage distributions at the 5% percentile, which is a common cut-off in the literature
(see e.g. Bowlus (1997) or Flabbi (2010)). The estimation of the reservation wage
distribution is, of coure, likely to be sensitive to the choice of the cut-off point. We
therefore explore the robustness of our parameter estimates below in Section 4.5,
and find that the frictional parameters are fairly stable, while µ increases usually
somewhat as the truncation increases from 3% to 7%.
3.1.1. Reduced Form Estimates: The Importance of Unobservable Heterogeneity
Before embarking on the estimation of the model, we first explore descriptively
whether there is scope for unobserved heterogeneity to play a role in explaining un-
employment durations. To this end, we estimate standard reduced-form proportional
hazard (PH) and mixed proportional hazard (MPH) models for the unemployed, con-
trolling incrementally for duration dependence and unobserved heterogeneity. Since
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Figure 2: Estimates of the density of accepted wages by labour market segments.
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Notes: Natives (solid lines) v. foreigners (dashed lines).
the conditional unemployment durations in the structural model are exponential with
parameter λF¯ (b) and the marginal durations are a mixture of such exponentials, we
first estimate an exponential PH model, and then allow for duration dependence by
estimating a Weibull specification. As the latter confounds dynamic sorting driven
by unobservable heterogeneity and genuine duration dependence (see e.g. van den
Berg (2001)), we then estimate MPH models using the common gamma frailty (as-
sumed to be independent of the covariates). Note, however, that these reduced-form
parameters do not identify the parameters of the structural model as the former
are complicated functions of the latter. In all models we condition on interactions
between age and occupational groups in order to mirror our subsequent structural
analysis of the corresponding labour market segments.
Table 5 reports the results. Across all models the migrant dummy is positive
throughout, so that their job offer arrival rates exceed those of natives. The Weibull
PH model suggests the presence of duration dependence, but the MPH reveals this
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to be caused by dynamic sorting: once unobservable heterogeneity is controlled for,
the Weibull parameter does not differ statistically from 1. Hence Weibull and ex-
ponential MPH models yield similar coefficient estimates. This inferred absence of
duration dependence is consistent with the structural model, as it cannot generate
genuine duration dependence but does yield dynamic sorting through unobserved
heterogeneity in reservation wages.
Table 5: Reduced-form unemployment duration models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exponential Weibull Weibull§ Exponential§
Migrant .087∗∗∗ .069∗∗∗ .049∗ 0.046∗
(.020) (.020) (.027) (.027)
Clerks × Twenties 1.368∗∗∗ 1.212∗∗∗ 1.409∗∗∗ 1.431∗∗∗
(.035) (.036) (.047) (.047)
Clerks × Thirties 1.059∗∗∗ .984∗∗∗ 1.197∗∗∗ 1.217∗∗∗
(.034) (.035) (.047) (.046)
Clerks × Fourtyplus .037 .011 -0.005 -0.006
(.037) (.037) (.045) (.046)
Skilled × Twenties 1.500∗∗∗ 1.327∗∗∗ 1.602∗∗∗ 1.631∗∗∗
(.031) (.031) (.043) (.041)
Skilled × Thirties .914∗∗∗ .867∗∗∗ 1.155∗∗∗ 1.182∗∗∗
(.032) (.033) (.045) (.044)
Skilled× Fourtyplus -0.429∗∗∗ -0.451∗∗∗ -0.531∗∗∗ -0.539∗∗∗
(.034) (.034) (.041) (.042)
Unskilled× Twenties 1.297∗∗∗ 1.153∗∗∗ 1.392∗∗∗ 1.417∗∗∗
(.035) (.035) (.047) (.046)
Unskilled × Thirties .864∗∗∗ .828∗∗∗ 1.062∗∗∗ 1.083∗∗∗
(.035) (.034) (.046) (.046)
duration
ln(α)
-.222∗∗∗ -.023∗
dependence (.006) (.012)
unobserved
θ
.702∗∗∗ .770∗∗∗
heterogeneity ( .042) (.024)
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses, ∗(p < 0.1), ∗∗∗(p < 0.001). Refer-
ence groups: Unskilled × Fourtyplus. §Frailty is Gamma distributed.
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4. Estimation Results
We proceed to estimate the structural parameters of the model, i.e. the job offer
arrival rate, λ, the match destruction rate, δ, and the parameters of the distribution
of workers’ reservation values, (µ, σ), as well as the density of firms’ productivity in
each segment. Each occupation group is considered in turn, and we segment for each
occupation the labour market further by age and nationality. The average migrant
effects and the wage decompositions are then quantified in detail in Section 5 below.
Table 6: Structural parameter estimates: Unskilled blue collar workers
Age Nation. µ σ λ δ k = λ/δ
25-30
N 53.76 11.10 .0666 .0257 2.59
[51.74-56.02] [9.67-14.06] [.0487-.0891] [.0241-.0268]
F 50.15 17.47 .1705 .0339 5.03
[46.91-52.04] [14.86-20.34] [.1447-.1932] [.0307-.0358]
30-40
N 50.97 8.76 .0416 .0098 4.24
[49.06-53.77] [6.95-11.10] [.0356-.0583] [.0092-.0106]
F 49.35 15.86 .1071 .0167 6.41
[46.33-50.78] [13.14-20.2] [.0762-.1261] [.0162-.0178]
40-55
N 54.05 10.10 .0355 .0051 6.96
[51.81-55.98] [8.56-11.87] [.0281-.0412] [.0048-.0056]
F 50.44 8.12 .0353 .0072 4.90
[47.62-52.88] [6.40-11.92] [.0221-.0501] [.0067-.0075]
Notes: In brackets: the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles of the bootstrap distribution.
4.1. Unskilled Blue Collar Workers
Table 6 reports the results. Across all three age groups, the labour turnover
parameters of migrants exceed those of natives, δˆF > δˆN and λˆF > λˆN . Migrants
experience job separations more often, but this is partially compensated by them
also finding new jobs more quickly. All job turnover parameters fall in age. Across
age groups and nationality, transitions into new jobs happen more quickly than tran-
sitions into unemployment, λˆ > δˆ. Foreigners have slightly lower mean reservation
wages, µˆF < µˆN , but confidence intervals overlap. The estimates are fairly stable
across age. The estimates for the reservation wage distribution for both groups imply
that not all new job offers are accepted: there are some workers with high reservation
wages who would and do turn down new job offers with insufficiently high wages.
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In Figure 3 we consider some implications of the estimated model for the young.
Panel A plots the wage offer functions, panel B the reservation wage density, whilst
panel C plots the estimated productivity densities10. It is evident that the produc-
tivity densities for both groups are well approximated by a Pareto density. The
slopes for sufficiently high productivities are very similar. Turning to wage offers
(panel A), for low productivities foreigners do not do worse than natives, while for
log productivities above 5 natives receive better wage offers. Overall, the figure sug-
gests a positive but small migrant effect, and this is confirmed by our quantifications
reported in Section 5.
Figure 3: Unskilled blue collar workers aged 25-30.
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4.2. Clerks and Low-Service Workers
Table 7 reports the results for this occupational group, for which we observed in
Table 4 the largest average wage gap. As before, job separation rates for foreigners
exceed those of natives, decline in age, and are smaller than job offer arrival rates.
10These are obtained as follows. Given the parameter estimates and kernel estimate of the
realised wage density, the unemployment rate u is estimated using equation (4), and the wage offer
distribution F follows from (5); the productivity distribution is then estimable from equation (6).
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Table 7: Structural parameter estimates: Clerks & service workers
Age Nation. µ σ λ δ k = λ/δ
25-30
N 65.60 14.39 .0984 .0194 5.07
[61.92-66.53] [11.61-15.8] [.0697-.0836] [.0189-.0199]
F 36.09 13.65 .0701 .0272 2.58
[30.88-41.69] [8.6-17.17] [.0624-.0886] [.0259-.0284]
30-40
N 72.66 9.42 .0423 .0073 5.79
[68.41-75.12] [7.54-10.39] [.0355-.0530] [.0071-.0076]
F 43.27 7.40 .0593 .0157 3.77
[40.88-45.62] [6.41-9.57] [.0478-.0703] [.0151-.0162]
40-55
N 73.07 7.92 .0698 .0035 19.94
[70.51-75.12] [7.07-9.16] [.0603-.0841] [.0031-.0037]
F 49.04 6.86 .0759 .0077 9.86
[46.38-51.94] [5.22-8.41] [.0565-.0911] [.0072-.0081]
Notes: As for Table 6.
Except for the young, the transition rates of foreigners exceed those of natives. But
unlike the case of the unskilled, differences in mean reservation wages are substan-
tial: foreigners are substantially less demanding, on average, than natives. These
means increase in age. Figure 4 panel C suggests that productivities are again well
approximated by a Pareto form, and panel A suggests that the maximal migrant
effect is substantial.
4.3. Skilled Blue-Collar Workers
For the skilled blue-collar workers, the by now familiar pattern emerges too, as
is evident from Table 8: both turnover parameters are higher for migrants, and
decline in age. As regards mean reservation wages, foreigners are less demanding
than natives, but the gap is not as wide as for clerks and service workers, and it
declines in age. Focussing on the young in Figure 5, productivities are Pareto like.
The migrant effect, captured in Panel A, is modest.
4.4. General Discussion
Comparing the results across occupations, we observe similar patterns. Migrants
experience job separations more often than natives but also typically find jobs more
quickly, and job turnover parameters tend to decline in age. These findings are in
line with differences in employment protection observed in Sa (2011), who reports
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Figure 4: Clerks and service workers aged 25-30.
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Table 8: Structural parameter estimates: Skilled blue collar workers
Age Nation. µ σ λ δ k = λ/δ
25-30
N 81.15 4.52 .0801 .0158 5.07
[77.64-83.97] [3.81-6.59] [.0684-.0911] [.0121-.0179]
F 66.38 14.05 .1067 .0225 4.74
[62.88-69.04] [11.88-17.32] [0.955-0.1182] [.0170-.0268]
30-40
N 76.68 8.85 .0698 .0068 10.26
[73.82-77.90] [7.69-9.71] [.0621-.0760] [.0063-.0071]
F 69.30 8.06 .0866 .0124 6.98
[65.57-72.05] [7.34-9.16] [.0681-.0946] [.0119-.0127]
40-55
N 79.71 6.44 .0408 .0035 11.66
[77.18-80.94] [5.62-7.01] [.0343-.0478] [.0033-.0036]
F 75.05 7.33 .0449 .0049 9.16
[71.48-78.24] [6.51-8.70] [.0325-.0512] [.0045-.0051]
Notes: As for Table 6.
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Figure 5: Skilled blue collar workers aged 25-30.
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that migrants in Germany are much more likely than natives to work on temporary
contracts. The findings are also consistent with the other dimensions of segrega-
tion extensively documented in Glitz (2012). Across all segments and nationality,
transitions into new jobs happen more quickly than transitions into unemployment.
Overall, search frictions, as measured by (λ/δ)−1, are of the same order of magni-
tude across all occupational groups, decrease in age (except for unskilled foreigners
in which case they are stable), and are larger for foreigners than for natives for the
skilled and clerks and service workers. Thus, the higher job offer arrival rate for
foreigners cannot compensate for their higher job separation rates. As regards the
reservation wage distribution, across all segments there are some workers with high
reservation wages who turn down new job offers when wage offers are too low.11 Mi-
grant workers are on average less demanding than natives. Firm productivities are
well approximated by Pareto forms. However, migrants receive wage offers that are
lower than for natives who have the same productivity. This migrant effect is the
largest for clerks and service workers, and small for unskilled workers. The drivers
of the migrant effect are the subject of Section 5.
4.5. Robustness Checks
4.5.1. Return Migration
A concern for our estimates in the migrant segments might be the effect of return
migration, when such returnees leave Germany out of employment. In order to
investigate the sensitivity of our estimates to this issue, we consider restricted samples
of migrants who should, in principle, be available for work after their employment
transition, by requiring foreigners to be observable in the data 6 months after their
transition. This restriction leads to a net dropout of foreigners (relative to that of
11These results differ from estimates for Netherlands (van den Berg and Ridder (1998)) and
France (Bontemps et al. (1999)) since both countries have a binding legal minimum wage. Similar
to these studies, however, we observe that job separation parameter δ is approximately one order
of magnitude smaller than the estimated job offer arrival rate λ. Our results are comparable to
those reported by Bartolucci (2013a) for Germany obtained from a different empirical search model
applied to a different market segmentation. For low qualified male workers in the manufacturing
sector he reports a job separation rate of .03 and a job offer arrival rate of .3. Our estimates of δ
range from .004 to .03, and the job offer arrival rate ranges from .04 to .17. Our result regarding
the mean reservation wage, the lack of a statistically significant difference between natives and
migrants for most groups, is also consistent with external evidence reported in Bergemann et al.
(2011, Table 2) who use the IZA evaluation sample of individuals who entered unemployment in
late 2007 and early 2008: the means of the self-reported reservation wages are not statistically
significantly different between natives and migrants, and their levels are comparable to ours.
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natives) across segments between 7.7% and 15.3%.12 Table 9 juxtaposes the estimates
for these restricted samples (labelled noRetMig) to our unrestricted estimates. We
find that most parameter estimates remain relatively stable (the occasional fall in
σˆ reflects the extent to which the sample restriction increases the homogeneity of
the group; the more homogeneous the sample, the smaller the estimated reservation
wage dispersion).
Table 9: Sensitivity analysis - the effect of excluding return migrants
Occupation Age Group µ σ λ δ
Unskilled
25-30
full 50.15 17.47 0.1705 0.0339
noRetMig 49.88 10.14 0.1207 0.0433
30-40
full 49.35 15.86 0.1071 0.0167
noRetMig 50.65 8.53 0.0588 0.0219
40-55
full 50.44 8.12 0.0353 0.0072
noRetMig 48.53 3.28 0.0495 0.0087
Skilled
25-30
full 66.38 14.05 0.1067 0.0225
noRetMig 65.00 9.05 0.0871 0.0281
30-40
full 69.30 8.06 0.0866 0.0124
noRetMig 68.72 5.86 0.0660 0.0142
40-55
full 75.05 7.33 0.0449 0.0049
noRetMig 62.74 7.44 0.0379 0.0058
25-30
full 36.09 13.65 0.0701 0.0272
noRetMig 37.84 11.37 0.0749 0.0344
Clerks
30-40
full 43.27 7.40 0.0593 0.0157
& Services noRetMig 45.11 9.09 0.0689 0.0201
40-55
full 49.04 6.86 0.0759 0.0077
noRetMig 48.23 5.39 0.1036 0.0098
4.5.2. The effect of truncating the wage distribution
Our samples have been truncated at 5% at the left tail of the wage distribution, a
common cut-off in the literature. Here, we examine the sensitivity of our estimates to
varying the cut-off from 3% to 7%. Table 10 reports the results. Across all segments,
12These rates are consistent with Gundel and Peters (2008, Table 1) who, using GSOEP data
for the period 1984-2005, suggest that among male immigrants aged less than 60 the return rate is
10%
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Table 10: Sensitivity analysis - the effects of truncation
Occupation Age Trunc. Foreigners Natives
µ σ λ δ µ σ λ δ
Unskilled
25-30
3% 45.31 19.68 .1698 .0344 42.77 15.85 .0603 .0256
5% 50.15 17.47 .1705 .0339 53.76 11.10 .0666 .0257
7% 54.47 15.18 .1593 .0333 56.72 9.53 .0783 .0254
30-40
3% 47.89 16.51 .1215 .0167 38.62 11.64 .0321 .0099
5% 49.35 15.86 .1071 .0167 50.97 8.76 .0416 .0098
7% 55.62 12.56 .1000 .0162 57.53 9.10 .0306 .0095
40-55
3% 40.18 3.86 .0435 .0074 38.62 11.64 .0321 .0099
5% 50.44 8.12 .0353 .0072 54.05 10.10 .0355 .0051
7% 52.83 7.64 .0298 .0071 53.87 14.73 .0276 .0049
Skilled
25-30
3% 57.41 18.69 .0915 .0229 72.78 9.66 .0611 .0162
5% 66.38 14.05 .1067 .0225 81.15 4.52 .0801 .0158
7% 71.79 10.38 .1061 .0219 82.65 3.72 .0729 .0154
30-40
3% 63.53 12.14 .0695 .0127 73.51 9.44 .0798 .0069
5% 69.30 8.06 .0866 .0124 76.68 8.85 .0698 .0068
7% 72.36 6.56 .0579 .0121 87.08 4.58 .0612 .0064
40-55
3% 67.90 7.57 .0557 .0045 69.17 8.12 .0407 .0036
5% 75.05 7.33 .0449 .0049 79.71 6.44 .0408 .0035
7% 77.32 5.81 .0392 .0045 83.31 5.40 .0583 .0035
25-30
3% 35.43 14.04 .0628 .0269 58.30 18.68 .1113 .0198
5% 36.09 13.65 .0701 .0272 65.60 14.39 .0984 .0194
7% 35.44 14.04 .0628 .0269 68.11 13.14 .0953 .0191
30-40
3% 41.98 7.83 .0608 .0156 62.80 15.13 .0555 .0075
Clerks 5% 43.27 7.40 .0593 .0157 72.66 9.42 .0423 .0073
& Services 7% 47.34 5.79 .0464 .0154 78.16 5.92 .0490 .0072
40-55
3% 47.89 8.88 .0534 .0078 66.87 10.03 .0452 .0035
5% 49.04 6.86 .0759 .0077 73.07 7.92 .0698 .0035
7% 48.59 5.09 .0635 .0076 78.09 6.47 .0709 .0034
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the frictional parameters δ and λ are very stable. An increase in the truncation
is expected to lead to an increase in the estimated mean reservation wage. This
increase, however, turns out to be typically very modest. We conclude that our
estimates are robust.
4.5.3. Ethnic German Immigrants
Table 11: Native workers: full and restricted sample results
Occupation Age Group µ σ λ δ
Unskilled
30-40
all 50.97 8.76 .0416 .0098
pre ’88 48.46 5.22 .0362 .0090
40-55
all 54.05 10.10 .0355 .0051
pre ’88 51.95 6.66 .0203 .0046
Skilled
30-40
all 76.68 8.85 .0698 .0068
pre ’88 88.53 2.78 .0700 .0060
40-55
all 79.71 6.44 .0408 .0035
pre ’88 81.34 7.51 .0407 .0032
Clerks 30-40
all 72.66 9.42 .0423 .0073
& Services
pre ’88 71.11 9.12 .0496 .0067
40-55
all 73.07 7.92 .0698 .0035
pre ’88 72.66 8.93 .0413 .0033
Notes: “all” refers to the full sample of native workers, “pre ’88” to the
sample of natives observed before 1988.
The inflow of foreign-born ethnic Germans in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s
changed the composition of the group of natives. While qualifying for a German
passport by descent, many did not speak German and were more similar to the group
of foreign nationals considered above. However, these ethnic German immigrants are
not directly identifiable in our data and thus latent in the group of natives. This
arguable misclassification could lead to biases in our estimates for native workers.
To check the robustness of our results to such changes in the population of German
citizens, we estimate the model using the subsample of native workers that are also
present in the data set before 1988 (labelled pre’88), the year before the inflow of
ethnic Germans occurred. Table 11 reports our estimates, and for ease of comparison,
juxtaposes these to our earlier results for the unrestricted sample (labelled all). The
young age group is excluded from this exercise since many in this group would be too
young to be employed pre 1988. The estimates are fairly similar in the full sample
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and the subsample, which suggests that the presence of ethnic Germans has only
little effect on the estimates of the structural parameters for natives.
5. Migrant Effects and Wage Decompositions
We proceed to examine actual and counterfactual decompositions of the wage
differential by considering the scenarios of Section 2.4.1. The discussion there has
highlighted the importance of the productivity distribution, and we operationalise
the decomposition as follows.
5.1. Calibration Details
Our estimation has yielded, given the (estimate of the) actual wage distributionG,
the estimated wage offer functions wei (p|λˆ, δˆ, µˆ, σˆ). Given the Pareto-like productivity
distributions, we calibrate wage offer functions wi(p|λˆ, δˆ, µˆ, σˆ, p, α) based on Pareto
productivity distributions by minimising the integrated absolute deviations between
wei (p|.) and wi(p|., p, α). Table 12 reports the calibrated parameters.
13
Table 12: Calibrated parameters of the Pareto productivity distribution.
Age Group Nationality
Unskilled Skilled Clerks
p α p α p α
25-30
Natives 79.789 2.511 81.282 3.172 67.677 2.449
Foreigners 47.632 2.205 51.010 2.146 43.053 1.468
30-40
Natives 84.343 2.894 71.212 3.076 104.849 3.096
Foreigners 57.071 2.611 61.414 2.661 41.818 1.463
40-55
Natives 70.263 2.842 69.293 3.045 72.222 3.197
Foreigners 70.202 2.833 63.838 2.896 34.545 1.738
Figure 6 illustrates these calibrations for young workers in the three occupations,
as well as the counterfactual experiment of improving the job turnover situation of
foreigners by lowering their job separation rate to those of natives, δF ≡ δN . The first
two columns of the figure show the close match between we(p) (which we have seen
before in Figure 3) and w(p). Column three depicts the calibrated wage offers wN(p)
(solid line) and wF (p) (dashed line), as well as the counterfactual wF (p|., δˆN) (dotted
13 These are also consistent with alternative estimates based on the shapes of Figures 3 - 5. The
approximate linearity in the productivity plots suggests a simple (graphical) estimator of the shape
parameter of the Pareto distributions: use OLS to estimate the regression of log density on log
productivity (and add 1).
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line). The reduction in the separation rate for foreigners from δˆF to δˆN ‘rotates’
the wage offer curve up: for lower productivities, the improvement is negligible, but
for very high productivities foreigners receive wage offers equal to or better than
those for natives. This results in the improvement in the density of accepted wages
depicted in the fourth column of the figure.
5.2. Results
Tables 13 to 15 report by age group the average migrant effect (row 1), as well
as the results of the counterfactual experiments which follow the structure of Table
1. We can anticipate the qualitative results of these experiments based on numerical
comparative statics exercises which show (for the set of parameters considered) that
wage offers increase in the job offer arrival rate λ as search frictions decrease, and,
contrariwise, decrease in the job separation rate δ as search frictions increase. Of
course, as k = λ/δ → ∞ and search frictions disappear, by eq. (3), wage offers
converge to the competitive wage. Wage offers increase in the mean reservation wage
µ, since by the reservation wage property of job search only sufficiently high wage
offers are accepted out of unemployment, but the effect of σ is ambiguous. Since we
found that job separation rates for foreigners always exceed those of natives, setting
δF = δN increases their wage offers, which implies a reduction both of the wage gap
and the migrant effect. Similarly, we found that λF > λN (except for young clerks
and service workers), so reducing the foreigners’ job offer arrival rate to that of natives
reduces their wage offers, which implies an increase both in the wage gap and the
migrant effect. As regards reservation wages, we found that foreigners are on average
less demanding than natives, but the overall effect of the joint experiment involving
(µ, σ) is ambiguous given the ambiguous effect of σ. All these qualitative effects are
observed in the results tables (experiments (1)-(4)). The principal objective of the
tables is then to quantify the impacts in order to understand the principal drivers of
the migrant effect.
We comment first on the level of the average migrant effect. Across all age groups,
the absolute migrant effect is the largest for clerks and service workers, followed by
the skilled, and is negligible for the unskilled. In relative terms, the migrant effect
of the skilled accounts for 12-15% of the average wage gap, and for clerks and ser-
vice workers for 23-39%, the average effect being 19.6 %. Expressed in terms of the
average segment-specific wage of natives (see Table 4), the migrant effect amounts
to 9.2-18.3% for clerks and service workers, 1.6-7.7% for skilled workers, 0.7-2.6% for
unskilled workers, and 5.6% for the full sample. The latter estimates are consistent
with estimates of “unexplained wage differences” reported in the literature for Ger-
many based on standard Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions (for instance, Lehmer and
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Ludsteck (2011) report a range from 4 to 17%) or complementary approaches (Hirsch
and Jahn (2012) report 6% while Bartolucci (2013b) suggests discrimination effects
ranging between 7 and 17%). The observed difference between the wage differential
and the migrant effect also implies that the largest part of the native-migrant wage
gap is explained by differences in the productivity distribution, which is confirmed
in experiment (9) by the drop in the wage gap (which now equals the migrant effect
by construction). Policy interventions that seek to reduce the productivity gap will
thus reduce the wage gap. We turn to the various experiments, highlighting the role
of search frictions.
Consider first the role of the mean reservation wage µ (experiment (2)). The
gap in mean reservation wages is the largest for clerks and service workers whilst
the dispersion parameters are fairly similar. Raising then the foreigners’ mean reser-
vation wages shows that the substantial migrant effect for this occupational group
is reduced to between 41% and 61% of its former level. For the skilled, we only
observe a significant gap in mean reservation wages for the young, and an equali-
sation of (µ, σ) reduces the migrant effect to 48% of its former level. For the other
age groups, and for the unskilled, differences in µ between natives and foreigners
are either small or negligible, so equalisations have little effect. Once productivity
differences have been eliminated, a comparison between experiments (9) and (10)
shows that for clerks and service workers, the relative improvement in the migrant
effect due to the additional equalisation of (µ, σ) is slightly larger (the migrant effect
is now between 20% and 30% of the level generated in experiment (9)). Turning to
the policy implications, although foreigners are on average less demanding than na-
tives, we believe that foreigners’ reservation wages should be less a concern for policy
interventions which are migrant-centred (as emphasised by recent policy debates in
the EU, e.g. EUCommission (2012, p. 28)) and seek to reduce the migrant effect.
Nor would any migrant-targeted benefit increase be politically feasible in the light
of the debate about welfare magnets.
By the same token, job arrival rates for foreigners typically exceed those of natives,
and thus should equally be of little policy concern. In fact, the experiments (4) show
that reducing this rate to that of natives only substantially increases the migrant
effect for the unskilled in the two first age groups; for all other groups the induced
increase in the migrant effect is fairly small. This is also in line with the observation
that λ falls in age for the unskilled and skilled.
We turn to the remaining frictional parameter, the job separation rate δ. Recall
that foreigners’ job separation rates are larger than those for natives, and sometimes
substantially so, and that search frictions experienced by them are typically larger
than those of natives as a higher λ cannot compensate for the higher δ. Hence there
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is scope for migrant-centred policy interventions that seek to reduce their search
frictions, such as improving migrants’ employment protection. This scope, however,
decreases in age, as δ falls in age across all occupational groups. Reducing the
foreigners’ job separation rates to that of natives has the largest absolute impact for
clerks and service workers, followed by the skilled. For the unskilled, the migrant
effect is already fairly small, and an equalisation of δ reduces the remainder further.
6. Conclusion
The use of the structural empirical general equilibrium search model with on-
the-job search has enabled us to disentangle the role of various unobservables for the
explanation of wage differentials between migrants and natives. In particular, we
have examined differences in search frictions, reservation wages, and productivities
in segments of the labour market defined by occupation, age, and nationality using
a large scale German administrative dataset. The resulting decompositions of the
actual and counterfactual wage differential quantify the marginal and joint roles of
the various factors.
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Figure 6: Calibration, migrant effects, and wage densities for young workers.
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Table 13: Wage differential decomposition and average migrant effects: Ages 25-30.
Unskilled Skilled Clerks
Counterfactually Remaining Wage Migrant Wage Migrant Wage Migrant
equalised para. differing para. differential effect differential effect differential effect
(1) p, α, µ, σ, λ, δ 61.717 2.779 62.463 9.560 43.426 16.929
(2) µ, σ p, α, λ, δ 61.740 2.793 60.964 4.609 38.357 6.995
(3) δ p, α, µ, σ, λ 60.806 0.349 61.260 7.691 40.637 14.205
(4) λ p, α, µ, σ, δ 64.804 11.272 63.437 11.146 40.639 14.206
(5) µ, σ, δ p, α, λ 60.828 0.373 59.900 3.150 36.253 5.321
(6) µ, σ, λ p, α, δ 64.803 11.134 61.804 5.798 36.254 5.322
(7) λ, δ p, α, µ, σ 63.917 8.793 62.237 9.201 37.861 11.681
(8) µ, σ, λ, δ p, α 63.930 8.729 60.766 4.334 34.028 3.660
(9) p, α µ, σ, λ, δ -4.336 4.142 11.569
(10) p, α, µ, σ λ, δ -4.962 0.264 3.501
(11) p, α, δ µ, σ, λ -6.137 2.610 9.065
(12) p, α, λ µ, σ, δ 2.989 5.529 9.066
(13) p, α, µ, σ, δ λ -6.756 -1.088 1.710
(14) p, α, µ, σ, λ δ 2.330 1.458 1.711
(15) p, α, λ, δ µ, σ 0.647 3.840 6.812
Notes: Based on the decomposition of equation (10). Rows 9+: the wage differential equals the migrant effect because the productivity
distributions are the same. The parameter estimates are reported in Tables 6- 8.
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Table 14: Wage differential decomposition and average migrant effects: Ages 30-40.
Unskilled Skilled Clerks
Counterfactually Remaining Wage Migrant Wage Migrant Wage Migrant
equalised para. differing para. differential effect differential effect differential effect
(1) p, α, µ, σ, λ, δ 59.484 0.854 29.662 3.904 89.489 28.642
(2) µ, σ p, α, λ, δ 59.699 1.456 28.539 2.228 87.086 17.559
(3) δ p, α, µ, σ, λ 57.916 -2.964 27.915 1.956 84.023 19.278
(4) λ p, α, µ, σ, δ 62.756 9.059 30.355 4.696 91.897 33.358
(5) µ, σ, δ p, α, λ 58.089 -2.472 26.937 0.476 82.447 11.304
(6) µ, σ, λ p, α, δ 63.106 10.004 29.159 2.922 88.962 20.378
(7) λ, δ p, α, µ, σ 60.872 4.298 28.503 2.603 86.404 23.116
(8) µ, σ, λ, δ p, α 61.136 5.027 27.482 1.065 84.526 13.974
(9) p, α µ, σ, λ, δ -3.091 2.547 14.515
(10) p, α, µ, σ λ, δ -2.585 1.097 3.011
(11) p, α, δ µ, σ, λ -5.709 0.758 8.259
(12) p, α, λ µ, σ, δ 3.264 3.286 18.087
(13) p, α, µ, σ, δ λ -5.249 -0.549 -2.022
(14) p, α, µ, σ, λ δ 3.938 1.763 5.737
(15) p, α, λ, δ µ, σ -0.563 1.349 10.719
Notes: As for Table 13.
37
Table 15: Wage differential decomposition and average migrant effects: Ages 40-55.
Unskilled Skilled Clerks
Counterfactually Remaining Wage Migrant Wage Migrant Wage Migrant
equalised para. differing para. differential effect differential effect differential effect
(1) p, α, µ, σ, λ, δ 2.817 2.723 19.784 2.327 64.712 14.591
(2) µ, σ p, α, λ, δ 1.728 1.631 18.883 1.172 62.721 6.298
(3) δ p, α, µ, σ, λ 1.145 1.056 18.971 1.404 62.127 11.248
(4) λ p, α, µ, σ, δ 2.788 2.694 20.030 2.608 65.002 15.012
(5) µ, σ, δ p, α, λ 0.125 0.032 18.114 0.304 60.519 4.125
(6) µ, σ, λ p, α, δ 1.700 1.603 19.113 1.433 62.954 6.553
(7) λ, δ p, α, µ, σ 1.120 1.030 19.193 1.655 62.374 11.533
(8) µ, σ, λ, δ p, α 0.100 0.008 18.325 0.541 60.737 4.321
(9) p, α µ, σ, λ, δ 2.716 1.699 7.375
(10) p, α, µ, σ λ, δ 1.623 0.601 1.676
(11) p, α, δ µ, σ, λ 1.049 0.828 5.173
(12) p, α, λ µ, σ, δ 2.687 1.966 7.660
(13) p, α, µ, σ, δ λ 0.025 -0.225 -0.160
(14) p, α, µ, σ, λ δ 1.595 0.851 1.905
(15) p, α, λ, δ µ, σ 1.023 1.064 5.359
Notes: As for Table 13.
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Appendix A. Data Appendix: Variable Description
Our sample only includes full-time working men aged 25-55 years old residing in
West Germany. In what follows, we describe how we construct the key variables used
in our empirical analysis.
Age: The age variable is constructed using information on the date of birth and the
year in which the spell took place. Date of birth is not available for individuals who
were under 16 years old at their first observed spell or over 65 years old at their last
observed spell. In such cases, we assume that workers were 15 years old at their first
spell and 67 years old at their last spell.
Labour Market Status: The information provided in the data set are sufficient
to distinguish between three labour market states: employed, recipient of transfer
payments, and out of sample. In our analysis, we employ the broad definition of
unemployment, as proposed by Fitzenberger and Wilke (2010), and assume that un-
employment is proxied by non-employment. Using this definition of unemployment,
we only consider two labour market states (employment and unemployment) since
being out of sample is equivalent to being unemployed. However, this strategy may
lead to the mis-classification of non-participants as unemployed: for example, an
individual that had an employment spell in her late teens, subsequently went to
university, and reappeared in the sample in her late twenties would be classified as
unemployed despite the fact that she was not in the labour market. To correct for
this problem, individuals that are out of sample are only classified as unemployed
if their out of sample duration does not exceed the average duration of transfer
payment recipients’ spells.
Spells: Due to the annual reporting system, all spells have a maximum duration
of one year. We merge all consecutive annual spells during which the individual
does not experience a change in her labour market status, i.e. she either remains
unemployed or employed with the same employer. We use firm-identifiers included in
the dataset to determine when a worker changes employers. The new merged spells
record the start date, the end date, the duration of the spell, the employment status,
the average wage under the same employer, and the transition experienced by the
individual (job-to-unemployment, job-to-job, unemployment-to-job).
Wages: The dataset reports gross daily wages and does not provide information on
hours worked. We therefore exclude part-time employees, trainees, interns, and at-
home workers from the sample since the wage information is not comparable for these
groups. Wages are truncated at the social security contributions threshold (DM10)
and censored at the social security contributions ceiling (DM300). For workers with
wages below the social security contribution threshold, we use wages of adjacent
employment spells. Wage censoring is not pronounced as the social security contri-
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butions ceiling is not binding in our sample as we focus on low-wage workers who
are not likely to earn wages in excess of this upper bound.
Since the focus of our analysis is the transitions experienced by workers in the
early 1990s, all wages are reported in DM and adjusted to real 1995 prices using the
German Consumer Price Index. For all individuals who experience wage variation
during employment spells, we compute the average per period wage of each worker
under the same employer.
Occupation: The dataset includes extensive information on occupations (three-
digit codes), which is used to classify individuals to 10 major groups based on the
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88). Exploiting the de-
tailed index of occupational titles of the ISCO-88, we are able to map the code list
from the Federal Employment Service of Germany included in the IABS into the
following ISCO-88 major groups: (1) Legislators, Senior Officials, and Managers; (2)
Professionals; (3) Technicians and Associate Professionals; (4) Clerks; (5) Service
Workers and Shop & Market Sales Workers; (6) Skilled Agricultural and Fishery
Workers; (7) Craft and Related Trades Workers; (8) Plant and Machine Operators
and Assemblers; (9) Elementary Occupations; (10) Armed Forces.
We restrict attention to low- and middle-skill occupations, where the concentra-
tion of foreigners is higher. Specifically, we consider three occupational groups that
are defined as follows: (1) Unskilled blue-collar workers, which includes individuals
classified in the ISCO-88 major groups 8 and 9; (2) Skilled blue-collar workers, which
includes individuals classified in the ISCO-88 major group 7; (3) Clerks & low-service
workers, which includes individuals classified in the ISCO-88 major groups 4 and 5.
Appendix B. Estimation: A Validation Exercise
Given the complexity of both the model and the estimating equations, it is of
interest to test their performance in a simulation exercise. In this appendix, we carry
out such a validation exercise.
The data generating process uses the parametrisations discussed above: arrival
of job offers and separations follow Poisson processes, and the reservation wage dis-
tribution is normal. The particular calibration, given in Table B.16, distinguishes
between the segments for natives (subscripted N) and immigrants (subscripted F),
and uses values similar to those encountered in our data. We also need to stipu-
late either a realised wage distribution G, or a productivity distribution Γ. Since
we observe wages but not productivities in our data, we specify a productivity dis-
tribution here in order to verify that the model-implied wage distributions “look
realistic” (i.e. share the principal features of real wage distributions). Since the em-
pirical results suggest that productivities are Pareto-like, we assume this explicitly
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here: ΓF (p) = 1 − (pF/p)
α and ΓN(p) = 1 − (pN/p)
α with α = 2.1, p
F
= 40, and
p
N
= 50. Hence the productivity distribution in the segment for natives first or-
der stochastically dominates that of migrants. We also compute the model-implied
unemployment rate u. Using this Data Generating Process (DGP), we draw 400
samples of 2000 observations each and estimate the model by maximum likelihood.
Table B.16: Natives and immigrants: DGP and parameter estimates.
µN µF σN σF λN λF δN δF uN uF
True Value 60 45 10 10 .07 .13 .005 .016 .1214 .1838
Mean 56.23 40.88 8.61 10.18 .0887 .1181 .0050 .0173 .1145 .1822
Median 56.33 40.96 8.43 10.17 .0835 .1136 .0050 .0173 .1142 .1819
2.5 perc. 53.46 36.62 5.63 6.86 .0566 .0939 .0047 .0164 .1053 .1711
97.5 perc. 59.88 45.21 12.38 13.62 .1403 .1671 .0053 .0181 .1246 .1935
Section 2.4 has considered the economic implications of the estimation results.
Here, the main focus is on the quality of the estimates. Table B.16 reports the results.
All structural parameters are estimated well as the true values are included in the
95% bootstrap confidence intervals (the table reports the 2.5 and 97.5 % confidence
limits). The means of the job turnover parameters are particularly well estimated.
The mean of the reservation wage distribution H is somewhat below the true value;
this underestimate is perhaps not too surprising since the model effectively only
considers the right tail of H (i.e. reservation wages b that satisfy b > w). The
predicted unemployment rate is also very close to the theoretical value.
Figure 1 above has depicted the implied wage offers as a function of productiv-
ities14 while Figure 6 has depicted the skewed densities of realised wages, which do
have a shape often encountered in empirical work (see e.g. Figure 2).
14The computation of the wage offer curves for the validation exercise based on a given productiv-
ity distribution Γ is more involved than in our empirical analysis below. In the latter case, given the
estimates of the structural parameters and the wage density, F (w) follows straightforwardly from
equation (5) and the productivity values follow from (6). In the former case, F (w) = Γ
(
K−1 (w)
)
,
and K(p) in (3), defined implicitly, is estimated progressively: starting from p, p is incremented
by a small step εp, and K(p+ εp) is found through a local search based on (3), whence p+ 2εp is
considered. The confidence bands are computed pointwise, and simply determined by the relevant
tail quantiles of the bootstrap distribution.
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